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OPINION OF THE COURT 
 
                
 
SLOVITER, Chief Judge. 
 
I. 
Facts and Procedural History 
 Appellant Dr. Alan H. Brader challenges the district 
court's dismissal of his antitrust and breach of contract claims 
against defendants Allegheny General Hospital, Allegheny Surgical 
Associates ("ASA"), Cardio-Thoracic Surgical Associates ("CTSA"), 
Dr. George J. Magovern, and Dr. Daniel L. Diamond.  Because the 
district court dismissed the complaint, the only facts before us 
are those alleged in the complaint itself. 
 Allegheny General, a hospital located in Pittsburgh, 
Pennsylvania, also serves as a regional referral hospital 
treating patients referred to it from Western Pennsylvania, 
Eastern Ohio and West Virginia.  ASA, a Pennsylvania corporation 
with offices in Pittsburgh, engages in the practice of general 
surgery, with principal emphasis in trauma and vascular surgery. 
Dr. Diamond is the President of ASA and Division Director for 
General Surgery at Allegheny General.  ASA obtains its patients 
through referrals from other physicians; Allegheny General uses 
ASA exclusively to perform its trauma service.  CTSA, a 
Pennsylvania corporation that also maintains its offices in 
Pittsburgh, practices in the field of cardio-thoracic surgery. 
Dr. Magovern is the President of CTSA and Chairman of the 
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Department of Surgery at Allegheny General.  CTSA obtains its 
patients through physician referrals and from on-call trauma 
referrals.  
 In July 1988, Brader, a physician licensed to practice 
in Pennsylvania and North Carolina, became a provisional staff 
member of Allegheny General and an employee of ASA.  In June 
1989, Magovern accused Brader of incompetence and of having 
improperly rendered trauma treatment to a patient who was on the 
call service of CTSA (Magovern's group) although the details of 
Magovern's displeasure are not spelled out in the complaint. 
According to Brader's complaint, Magovern had no factual basis to 
support his accusations.  Nonetheless, shortly thereafter, when 
the issue of Brader's advancement from provisional to regular 
staff status at Allegheny General arose, it was opposed by 
Magovern.  Solely as a result of Magovern's opinion and based on 
this single issue, Diamond told Brader that he should look 
elsewhere for employment, that he would not support him for staff 
membership, that his prior support for Brader had jeopardized his 
"political" career at Allegheny General, and that Brader could 
not practice medicine at Allegheny General if he was not employed 
with ASA.   
 Sometime after this conversation, Diamond conducted an 
informal quality assurance study of (presumably Brader's) 
ruptured abdominal aortic aneurysm (AAA) procedures, which Brader 
contends was not performed in accordance with Allegheny General's 
medical staff bylaws.  In May 1990 after the study was completed, 
at a meeting between Brader, Diamond and representatives of 
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Allegheny General, Diamond tried to suspend Brader, allegedly in 
violation of the bylaws and for no reasonable basis related to 
the quality of plaintiff's performance. 
 Later in May, at a meeting of Brader, Magovern and 
Diamond, Brader agreed to an independent review of his surgical 
record on AAA procedures.  Magovern selected Dr. John Ochsner to 
conduct it.  Brader alleges that Ochsner was a personal friend of 
Magovern.  According to Brader, Diamond, Magovern and Allegheny 
General submitted inadequate and misleading information to 
Ochsner for his review.  In addition, Brader contends that he was 
prevented from having an informal conference with Ochsner in 
violation of the medical staff bylaws. 
 Ochsner concluded, as a result of the inadequate and 
misleading information, that Brader's mortality experience was 
not surprising or unexpected but recommended that his performance 
of ruptured AAA procedures should be supervised due to excessive 
morbidity.  In October 1990 Magovern summarily suspended Brader's 
privileges to perform AAA procedures at the hospital without any 
factual basis.  Later that month, Brader's application for 
advancement to attending staff status at Allegheny General was 
denied on the recommendations of Diamond and Magovern, and in 
part at Magovern's recommendation all of Brader's clinical 
privileges at the hospital were suspended.  App. at 58. 
    Brader appealed all of these adverse actions in 
accordance with the medical staff bylaws.  On October 9, 1991, a 
hearing panel recommended that the suspension of Brader's 
ruptured and elective AAA privileges be lifted, but on October 
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25, 1992 a hearing panel recommended that the decision not to 
advance Brader to attending staff status be sustained, and 
concluded that Brader's challenge to the suspension of his 
clinical privileges was moot.  App. at 59.  According to Brader's 
complaint, the decision not to advance him to attending staff 
status violated the medical staff bylaws because it was based on 
hearsay and he had no opportunity to confront the witnesses 
against him.  App. at 60.   
 Brader appealed the adverse October 25, 1992 decision 
to an Appellate Review Panel, which on January 7, 1993 affirmed 
the recommendation not to advance Brader but concluded that there 
was no evidence to warrant the continuation of the suspension of 
Brader's clinical privileges.  On February 26, 1993, however, the 
Allegheny General Board of Directors, allegedly in violation of 
the medical staff bylaws, reimposed the suspension of Brader's 
AAA procedures at the hospital.   
 Brader tried to obtain staff privileges at other 
hospitals in Allegheny County and Washington County, but he was 
unable to do so due to his suspension from Allegheny General. 
Brader contends that defendants' actions have prevented him from 
practicing medicine in any location within the market area served 
by the defendants and forced him to relocate his practice to 
North Carolina. 
 On November 18, 1993, Brader filed a three-count 
complaint against defendants alleging claims for violations of 
sections 1 and 2 of the Sherman Act as well as a claim for breach 
of contract arising from the alleged violations of the medical 
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staff bylaws.  Shortly thereafter, Brader filed an Amended 
Complaint in order to correct the spelling of Magovern's name.   
 Defendants moved to dismiss Brader's Amended Complaint 
arguing that the complaint failed to allege facts sufficient to 
support the conclusion that Brader had suffered an "antitrust 
injury" so as to confer standing and that the complaint failed to 
allege various facts, such as the existence of a conspiracy and 
the relevant market power of the defendants, to support Brader's 
claims under the Sherman Act.  The defendants also sought to 
dismiss Brader's claim of breach of contract because the 
complaint failed to allege which sections of the medical staff 
bylaws, if any, had been breached, and failed to allege facts 
sufficient to show that any of the alleged infractions were not 
merely de minimus violations.  Finally, defendants argued that 
they were immune from suit with respect to all of Brader's claims 
under the Health Care Quality Improvement Act (HCQIA), 42 U.S.C. 
§§ 11101-11152.  Brader sought leave to amend the complaint, and 
submitted a proposed Second Amended Complaint, and defendants 
renewed their motion to dismiss, relying upon the same grounds 
raised in the earlier motion. 
 By order dated September 14, 1994, the district court 
dismissed the Amended Complaint, granted Brader leave to amend, 
ordered the Second Amended Complaint to be filed, and granted 
defendants' motion to dismiss the Second Amended Complaint.  In 
its accompanying opinion, the district court stated that the 
Second Amended Complaint contained sufficient allegations 
regarding a conspiracy and defendants' market power, but "failed 
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to adequately plead that there was an unlawful purpose for the 
defendants' conduct or that there was an actual anticompetitive 
effect as a result of plaintiff being denied staff privileges." 
App. at 13.  The district court dismissed Brader's claims under 
both section 1 and section 2 of the Sherman Act on the ground 
that the complaint "does not suggest that [the defendants'] 
action did, or could have, effected [sic] interstate commerce in 
an anticompetitive manner."  App. at 13.  The court also 
dismissed Brader's breach of contract claim, holding that the 
Second Amended Complaint contained sufficient specific 
allegations of the bylaw sections allegedly breached by the 
defendants, but that it failed to allege facts sufficient to 
support a causal link between those alleged breaches and the 
injuries suffered by Brader.  The district court's opinion did 
not address the defendants' claim of immunity to Brader's suit 
under HCQIA.   
 Brader now appeals the district court's dismissal of 
his Second Amended Complaint.  This court has jurisdiction of 
Brader's appeal pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1291.  We have plenary 
review over a district court's grant of a motion to dismiss. 
Malia v. General Elec. Co., 23 F.3d 828, 830 (3d Cir.), cert. 
denied, 115 S. Ct. 377 (1994).  In conducting our review, we 
accept as true all facts alleged in the complaint and all 
reasonable inferences that can be drawn therefrom.  Id. 
II. 
Discussion 
A. 
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 Brader first contends that the district court erred in 
concluding that his complaint failed to allege the requisite 
nexus between the defendants' activities and interstate commerce 
to support his antitrust claims.  There is no dispute that both 
of Brader's antitrust claims require a showing that the 
defendants' actions affect interstate commerce.  Section 1 of the 
Sherman Act provides that "[e]very contract, combination . . ., 
or conspiracy, in restraint of trade or commerce among the 
several States, or with foreign nations, is declared to be 
illegal."  15 U.S.C. § 1 (emphasis added).  Section 2 provides 
that "[e]very person who shall monopolize, or attempt to 
monopolize, or combine or conspire with any other person or 
persons, to monopolize any part of the trade or commerce among 
the several states, or with foreign nations, shall be deemed 
guilty of a misdemeanor . . . ."  15 U.S.C. § 2 (emphasis added). 
Moreover, the parties agree that for the purposes of the 
interstate commerce requirement, there is no distinction between 
section 1 and section 2 of the Sherman Act.  See Weiss v. York 
Hosp., 745 F.2d 786, 825 n.67 (3d Cir. 1984), cert. denied, 470 
U.S. 1060 (1985). 
 Although the "interstate commerce requirement" of the 
Sherman Act is often referred to as "jurisdictional," the Supreme 
Court has held that there is no practical distinction between the 
"jurisdictional" interstate commerce inquiry and consideration of 
whether a complaint pleads an effect on interstate commerce 
sufficient to state a claim for relief under the Sherman Act.  In 
Hospital Bldg. Co. v. Trustees of Rex Hosp., 425 U.S. 738, 742 & 
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n.1 (1976), the Court stated that an analysis of challenges to 
antitrust claims based on the interstate commerce element under 
either Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(1) or 12(b)(6) leads 
to the same result.  Similarly, in Weiss we noted that "[the] 
interstate impact requirement has been construed as an element of 
both jurisdiction and the substantive offense under the Sherman 
Act," and that "[t]he inquiry is the same for both elements." 745 
F.2d at 824 n.67 (citations omitted); see also Note, Sherman Act 
"Jurisdiction" in Hospital Staff Exclusion Cases, 132 U. Pa. L. 
Rev. 121, 126-29 (1983). 
 Moreover, the Supreme Court has held that the reach of 
the Sherman Act is as broad as Congress's power under the 
Commerce Clause.  McLain v. Real Estate Bd. of New Orleans, 444 
U.S. 232, 241-42 (1980); see also Hospital Bldg. Co., 425 U.S. at 
743 n.2; United States v. Frankfort Distilleries, Inc., 324 U.S. 
293, 298 (1945).  Thus, the interstate commerce requirement of 
the Sherman Act may be satisfied by demonstrating that 
defendant's activities either are in interstate commerce or 
affect interstate commerce.  McLain, 444 U.S. at 242. 
  In Summit Health, Ltd. v. Pinhas, 500 U.S. 322 (1991), 
the Supreme Court addressed the interstate commerce requirement 
of the Sherman Act with respect to the attempted exclusion of a 
physician from a particular geographic market.  Pinhas, an 
ophthalmologist, alleged that a hospital, its corporate owner and 
its medical staff conspired in violation of section 1 of the 
Sherman Act to prevent him from providing ophthalmological 
services in the Los Angeles market by, inter alia, initiating 
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peer review proceedings against him, summarily suspending and 
terminating his medical staff privileges, and threatening to 
distribute an adverse report about him to all hospitals in the 
market area.  Id. at 324, 326-27. 
 The defendants moved to dismiss the complaint, 
contending that there was no "factual nexus between the restraint 
on this one surgeon's practice and interstate commerce."  Id. at 
330.  The Supreme Court rejected this argument, stating that the 
alleged conspiracy, if successful, would cause "a reduction in 
the provision of ophthalmological services in the Los Angeles 
market."  Id. at 331.  The Court reasoned that the "competitive 
significance of [the single physician's] exclusion from the 
market must be measured, not just by a particularized evaluation 
of his own practice, but rather, by a general evaluation of the 
impact of the restraint on other participants and potential 
participants in the market from which he has been excluded."  Id. 
at 332.  The Court concluded that the complaint satisfied the 
interstate commerce requirement of the Sherman Act.  Id. at 333. 
 Brader argues that the facts of this case are 
essentially identical to the facts of Summit Health.  In a 
graphic side-by-side column analysis in his brief, Brader 
demonstrates that like Pinhas in Summit Health he has alleged 
that the defendants conspired to suspend his medical privileges 
through a biased and unfair peer review process.  In addition, as 
in Summit Health, the alleged effect of the defendants' actions 
was to deny Brader access to the relevant geographic market, as 
the hospital's dissemination of the report of his suspension has 
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allegedly prevented him from obtaining another position, causing 
a reduction in the provision of medical services to the 
Pittsburgh market.  Brader then argues that the district court's 
conclusion that his complaint failed to allege a sufficient 
effect on interstate commerce is fundamentally inconsistent with 
Summit Health. 
 The district court attempted to distinguish Summit 
Health on the ground that the dispute in that case arose from the 
physician's objection to the hospital's costly requirement that 
eye surgeons absorb the cost of an assistant surgeon during 
surgical procedures.  See Summit Health, 500 U.S. at 326.  The 
district court reasoned that this case involved no similar 
"systemic anticompetitive effect on interstate commerce," and 
that because Brader alleges no "market-wide" harm, Summit Health 
was inapplicable.   
 The Summit Health opinion is somewhat unclear on 
whether the interstate commerce nexus was satisfied merely by the 
defendants' attempt to exclude the plaintiff from the relevant 
market, or by the fact that the attempted exclusion was coupled 
with an allegation regarding the defendants' "insist[ence] upon 
adhering to an unnecessarily costly procedure."  Summit Health, 
500 U.S. at 332.  However, our decision in Fuentes v. South Hills 
Cardiology, 946 F.2d 196 (3d Cir. 1991), resolved this ambiguity 
by holding that the mere exclusion of a single physician from a 
market is sufficient.  In Fuentes, a plaintiff physician brought 
a Sherman Act claim against a hospital and medical group due to 
the termination of the physician's medical privileges.  Fuentes, 
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946 F.2d at 197.  When the plaintiff could not obtain another 
position within or outside of Pennsylvania, he alleged that the 
defendants were acting in concert to effect an interstate boycott 
of his services.  Id. at 198.  There is no suggestion in the 
Fuentes opinion that Fuentes alleged that the defendants were 
engaged in anti-competitive pricing practices similar to those 
alleged in Summit Health; the only alleged anti-competitive 
effect referred to in Fuentes was the exclusion of the plaintiff 
physician from the relevant market.  Notably, the termination in 
Fuentes, like the termination in this case, apparently arose over 
"a disagreement concerning patient care."  Id. at 197. 
 Despite the lack of broader allegations regarding the 
defendants' anticompetitive motive, we inferred from Fuentes' 
allegations that he was excluded from practicing in the relevant 
market and that out-of-state patients who travelled to Pittsburgh 
would be deprived of Fuentes' services.  Id. at 200.  Thus, the  
plaintiff in Fuentes had alleged a sufficient effect on 
interstate commerce to support his Sherman Act claim.  Id. at 
201. 
 The Fuentes opinion forecloses the district court's 
restrictive reading of Summit Health and controls the "interstate 
commerce" issue in this case.  Brader, like Fuentes, has alleged 
that the defendants wrongfully terminated his staff privileges at 
Allegheny General and that such denial limited his ability to 
serve patients in the relevant market.  At the complaint stage no 
more is required, as defendants conceded at oral argument.  Under 
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Fuentes, this allegation is sufficient to satisfy the "interstate 
commerce requirement" of the Sherman Act. 
B. 
 Defendants next contend that we may affirm the 
dismissal on any ground presented to the district court, see 
Langer v. Monarch Life Ins. Co., 966 F.2d 786, 807-08 (3d Cir. 
1992), and that we may do so here because Brader failed to plead 
facts sufficient to support the conclusion that he suffered an 
"antitrust injury."  They state that while the district court may 
have erroneously used the "interstate commerce" label, in effect 
it concluded that no antitrust injury was pled because Brader's 
complaint did not allege that defendants' actions had any 
measurable impact on any market.1 
 Defendants' argument proceeds along the following 
steps:  Brader's right to maintain a private cause of action for 
damages flows from section 4 of the Clayton Act, which provides 
for suits by "any person who shall be injured in his business or 
property by reason of anything forbidden in the antitrust laws 
. . . ."  15 U.S.C. § 15(a).  This requires proof that the 
plaintiff suffered an "antitrust injury" before recovering 
                                                           
1
  Judge Alito would not reach the question addressed in part IIB 
of this opinion.  He does not think that the district court's 
decision was based on the question of antitrust injury. Thus, in 
his view, part IIB addresses a possible alternative ground for 
affirmance and, as a discretionary matter, he would not reach 
that question now.  The question is a difficult one --compare 
part IIB with BCB Anesthesia Care v. Passavant Memorial Area 
Hosp., 36 F.3d 664, 669 (7th Cir. 1994); Lie v. St. Joseph Hosp., 
964 F.2d 567, 570 (6th Cir. 1992) -- and he thinks that it would 
be preferable for the question to be decided in the first 
instance by the district court. 
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damages for that violation.  See Atlantic Richfield Co. v. USA 
Petroleum Co, 495 U.S. 328, 339 (1990); Brunswick Corp. v. Pueblo 
Bowl-o-Mat, Inc., 429 U.S. 477, 489 (1977).  According to 
defendants, this "antitrust injury" rule requires that Brader 
plead facts to support the inference that defendants caused an 
injury to competition, which in turn injured Brader.  Defendants 
contend that this requirement is far more stringent than the mere 
"jurisdictional" requirement of the interstate commerce test, and 
that therefore Summit Health and Fuentes do not resolve the issue 
in this case. 
 Defendants' argument, even if not implausible, appears 
to be flatly inconsistent with Fuentes.  There too we considered 
whether the complaint of a physician whose hospital privileges 
were allegedly terminated at the request of physicians with whom 
he had been associated stated a claim for relief under the 
Sherman Act.  Fuentes had alleged that "the defendants acted in 
concert to deny Fuentes, a provider of cardiological services, 
access to the Pittsburgh cardiological market," and that "by 
eliminating him as a competitor, the boycott successfully reduced 
competition for the defendants' cardiological services." Fuentes, 
946 F.2d at 202.  Accepting as true Fuentes' allegations and all 
reasonable inferences therefrom we concluded that these 
allegations were sufficient to survive a motion to dismiss, as 
"such an exclusion constitutes an unlawful restraint of trade." 
Id.; see also Boczar v. Manatee Hosps. & Health Sys., Inc., 993 
F.2d 1514, 1519 (11th Cir. 1993) (hospital's actions in 
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suspending the plaintiff's privileges "had the effect of 
restraining trade"). 
 Brader's Second Amended Complaint alleges that the 
defendants' activities "prevent[ed] the Plaintiff and others from 
engaging in the practice of general vascular trauma surgery in 
the relevant market, and . . . prevent[ed] other hospitals in the 
relevant market from employing or granting medical staff 
privileges to the Plaintiff for the purpose of competing with 
defendants."  App. at 64.  This conduct, Brader alleges, has 
"prevent[ed] competition in the relevant product market within 
the relevant geographic market."  App. at 64.  Under Fuentes, 
these allegations are sufficient to state a claim for an 
antitrust injury. 
 We are not in a position to predict whether Brader will 
ultimately be able to sustain his burden of proof on this issue 
since Brader has not yet had an opportunity to obtain evidence. 
After Summit Health, the adequacy of a physician's contentions 
regarding the effect on competition is typically resolved after 
discovery, either on summary judgment or after trial.  See, e.g., 
Lie v. St. Joseph Hosp., 964 F.2d 567, 570 (6th Cir. 1992) 
(affirming summary judgment where physician failed to show "an 
injury to competition in the form of increased cost or reduced 
supply of services or harm to the consumer"); Tarabashi v. 
McAlester Regional Hosp., 951 F.2d 1558, 1571 (10th Cir. 1991) 
(affirming judgment against physician after trial in part because 
physician "failed to establish the required impact upon 
competition") (emphasis in original), cert. denied, 112 S. Ct. 
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2996 (1992); Oksanen v. Page Memorial Hosp., 945 F.2d 696 (4th 
Cir. 1991) (in banc) (affirming summary judgment for hospital and 
medical staff after physician had "received adequate discovery on 
the key issues" on his claim of antitrust violations arising from 
alleged misuse of peer review process), cert. denied, 502 U.S. 
1074 (1992).   
 Even the antitrust cases cited by defendants that do 
not involve physicians suggest that the existence of an 
"antitrust injury" is not typically resolved through motions to 
dismiss.  See, e.g., Atlantic Richfield Co., 495 U.S. at 346 
(finding plaintiff had "failed to demonstrate that it has 
suffered any antitrust injury" at summary judgment stage); Town 
Sound & Custom Tops, Inc. v. Chrysler Motors Corp., 959 F.2d 468, 
495 (3d Cir.) (in banc) (addressing "antitrust injury" issue in 
summary judgment context), cert. denied, 113 S. Ct. 196 (1992); 
Tunis Bros. Co. v. Ford Motor Co., 952 F.2d 715, 727-28 (3d Cir. 
1991) (resolving "antitrust injury" issue on appeal of denial of 
motion for judgment notwithstanding the verdict), cert. denied, 
112 S. Ct. 3034 (1992).   
 We recognize that one court of appeals has upheld the 
dismissal for failure to state a claim in an antitrust complaint 
filed by nurse anesthetists alleging a conspiracy between a 
hospital and physicians to terminate plaintiffs' contract for 
services.  See BCB Anesthesia Care, Ltd. v. Passavant Memorial 
Area Hosp. Ass'n, 36 F.3d 664, 668-69 (7th Cir. 1994).  The 
district court based the dismissal on plaintiffs' failure to 
allege a sufficient nexus with interstate commerce, a rationale 
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that the appellate court did not accept.  Instead, the court of 
appeals, in a divided opinion, upheld dismissal of the complaint 
stating that "[a] staffing decision does not itself constitute an 
antitrust injury," id. at 669, notwithstanding that the hospital 
was the only acute care general hospital within twenty-five 
miles, which substantially limited plaintiffs' options.  Id. at 
668.  The court recognized that the substitution of medical 
physician anesthetists might cause "the prices the hospital 
charges [to] be somewhat higher now than they were."  Id.  The 
BCB majority even acknowledged that the antitrust injury issue is 
one that is typically reserved for summary judgment.  Id.  As the 
dissent in BCB noted, it is difficult to reconcile the majority's 
conclusion with Summit Health.  Id. at 669 (Cudahy, dissenting). 
 The BCB majority stressed the inconvenience to the 
courts of proceeding beyond the pleading stage and noted the 
"hundreds or thousands of pages" of decisions in antitrust cases 
decided after discovery in which the plaintiff physicians have 
ultimately been unsuccessful.  Id. at 667.  We believe that such 
impatience with the notice pleading embodied in the Federal Rules 
is foreclosed by the Supreme Court's decision in Leatherman v. 
Tarrant County Narcotics Intelligence & Coordination Unit, 113 S. 
Ct. 1160, 1163 (1993) (rejecting a "heightened pleading standard" 
in a case arising under 42 U.S.C. § 1983), and is an issue to be 
addressed, if needed, by Congress.  We decline to adopt the BCB 
majority approach here. 
 Defendants' argument that Brader is a "poor champion of 
consumers" is essentially the same argument.  They take the quote 
18 
from a case decided after discovery in which we upheld the 
judgment because of the plaintiff's failure to show that its loss 
of sales was sufficiently related to the anticompetitive activity 
alleged.  See Alberta Gas Chems. Ltd. v. E.I. du Pont de Nemours 
& Co., 826 F.2d 1235, 1239 (3d Cir. 1987)(quoting Ball Memorial 
Hosp. v. Mutual Hosp. Ins., Inc., 784 F.2d 1325, 1334 (7th Cir. 
1986)), cert. denied, 486 U.S. 1059 (1988).  They also rely on 
Todorov v. DCH Healthcare Auth., 921 F.2d 1438, 1454 (11th Cir. 
1991), which affirmed summary judgment against the plaintiff 
physician who had not even argued that his exclusion from the 
market hurt competition and increased prices for consumers, but 
instead sought an injunction so that he could join a virtual 
monopoly and share in the physicians' supercompetitive profits. 
In contrast, the type of injury alleged by Brader (the loss of 
income due to an inability to practice in the relevant market 
area) is directly related to the illegal activity in which the 
defendant allegedly engaged: a conspiracy to exclude Brader from 
the relevant market.  
 Under Summit Health and Fuentes, Brader's pleading 
requirement on this issue is satisfied by his allegation that the 
defendants unreasonably restricted his ability to practice in the 
Pittsburgh area and thereby "successfully reduced competition" 
for the defendants' services.  See Fuentes, 946 F.2d at 202.  We 
therefore reject defendants' argument regarding the adequacy of 
Brader's pleading of an "antitrust injury" and decline to affirm 
the dismissal of his claim on this ground at this stage of the 
litigation. 
19 
C. 
 Defendants contend that we should affirm the decision 
of the district court on the alternative ground that the Second 
Amended Complaint fails to contain sufficient allegations 
regarding the defendants' market power.  Market power may be 
relevant in some Sherman Act section 1 claims but it is an 
essential factor to be considered in all Sherman Act section 2 
claims.  Neither the parties nor the district court make the 
distinctions necessary to analyze those two sections, and we are 
unwilling to affirm on this ground in the absence of any 
consideration by the district court.  We briefly set forth the 
distinctions, as the issue will inevitably arise on remand.  
 Under section 2 of the Sherman Act, Brader must show, 
at a minimum, that defendants have "a dangerous probability of 
achieving monopoly power" in the relevant market.  Spectrum 
Sports, Inc. v. McQuillan, 113 S. Ct. 884, 890-91 (1993); see 
also Pastore v. Bell Telephone Co., 24 F.3d 508, 512 (3d Cir. 
1994).  Although disposition of that question is typically one 
that is not resolved at the pleading stage unless it is clear on 
the face of the complaint that the "dangerous probability" 
standard cannot be met as a matter of law, the complaint should 
allege viable relevant markets.  Brader's complaint is not 
specific as to either the product market or the relevant 
geographic market.  In his count alleging violation of section 2, 
he refers to the product market as "the practice of certain 
specialized vascular and trauma surgery and cardio-thoracic 
surgery at [Allegheny General]."  App. at 66.  Elsewhere the 
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complaint states that "the geographic extent of [the market from 
which he was excluded] is co-existent with the area from which 
the defendants attract their patients which will be further 
defined through discovery."  App. at 63.  It appears that Brader 
suggests two geographic markets, one confined to the hospital and 
the other encompassing a portion of the tri-state area.  
 We do not decide whether under these circumstances 
Allegheny General is an appropriate geographic market, but we 
note that every court that has addressed this issue has held or 
suggested that, absent an allegation that the hospital is the 
only one serving a particular area or offers a unique set of 
services, a physician may not limit the relevant geographic 
market to a single hospital.  See, e.g., Collins v. Associated 
Pathologists, Ltd., 844 F.2d 473, 480 n.5 (7th Cir.) (physician 
was "slicing the geographic market much too thin" in limiting 
market to one hospital), cert. denied, 488 U.S. 852 (1988); 
Seidenstein v. National Medical Enterprises, Inc., 769 F.2d 1100, 
1106 (5th Cir. 1985) (no evidence that the hospital "is 
recognized as a separate and distinct market, or that unique 
services or facilities existed there"); Dos Santos v. Columbus-
Cuneo-Cabrini Medical Ctr., 684 F.2d 1346, 1353 (7th Cir. 1982) 
(noting that "we have reason to doubt whether the relevant market 
can be sliced so small as to embrace only a single hospital"); 
Flegel v. Christian Hosp. Northeast-Northwest, 804 F. Supp. 1165, 
1174 (E.D. Mo. 1992) (limiting the relevant geographic market to 
one hospital lacked any "reasonable legal or factual basis"), 
aff'd, 4 F.3d 682 (8th Cir. 1993); Drs. Steuer & Latham P.A. v. 
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National Medical Enterprises, Inc., 672 F. Supp. 1489, 1514 
(D.S.C. 1987), aff'd, 846 F.2d 70 (4th Cir. 1988); Friedman v. 
Delaware County Memorial Hosp., 672 F. Supp. 171, 195 (E.D. Pa. 
1987), aff'd, 849 F.2d 600 (3d Cir. 1988). 
 On the other hand, there is some suggestion in the 
complaint and in the briefs that Allegheny General may offer 
unique trauma and vascular surgery services in the broader 
geographic tri-state area served by Allegheny General.  We leave 
for the district court whether the complaint makes a colorable 
claim that the defendants have "a dangerous probability of 
achieving monopoly power" over the relevant product in that area. 
 In contrast, under section 1 of the Sherman Act the 
defendants' "market power" is relevant only to the extent that it 
is a factor in the determination of the reasonableness of the 
restraint.  See e.g., Oksanen, 945 F.2d at 709.  Defendants have 
not presented any case holding that the precise scope of that 
"market power" must be specifically pled in the complaint to 
support the type of section 1 claim at issue here.  Neither 
Summit Health nor Fuentes so suggested.  Therefore, we decline to 
accept defendants' suggestion that we affirm on this alternative 
ground. 
D. 
 Brader alleged a breach of contract claim asserting a 
series of violations by the defendants of the medical staff 
bylaws.  The district court dismissed this claim on the ground 
that the complaint failed to allege a connection between the 
alleged breaches and the losses suffered by Brader.  In 
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particular, the district court found that Ochsner's independent 
review of Brader's record superseded the alleged breach committed 
by Diamond in conducting the informal quality assurance review, 
that Diamond's unsuccessful attempts to suspend Brader 
unilaterally could not have caused Brader any damage, and that 
Brader had relocated to North Carolina before the reimposition of 
his suspension by the hospital in February 1993, and therefore 
the reimposed suspension could not have caused his losses. 
 Brader argues that the district court erred in assuming 
that he would have been suspended regardless of any breach of the 
bylaws and that he has not suffered any economic damages as a 
result.  These conclusions, Brader reasons, are factual and 
should not be the basis of a dismissal order under Rule 12(b)(6). 
  The parties agree that, under Pennsylvania law, the 
Allegheny General medical staff by-laws constitute an enforceable 
contract between a hospital and members of its medical staff. See 
Miller v. Indiana Hosp., 419 A.2d 1191, 1193 (Pa. Super. Ct. 
1980).  In order to state a claim for damages arising from a 
breach of contract, a plaintiff must also plead damages resulting 
from the alleged breach.  See General State Auth. v. Coleman 
Cable & Wire Co., 365 A.2d 1347, 1349 (Pa. Commw. Ct. 1976). This 
is a natural extension of the general rule that damages for 
breach of contract are not recoverable unless there is a "causal 
relationship between the breach and the loss."  See Robinson 
Protective Alarm Co. v. Bolger & Picker, 516 A.2d 299, 303 n.9 
(Pa. 1986). 
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 Brader's complaint adequately alleges the requisite 
causal connection.  The complaint alleges that the defendants' 
breach of the bylaws caused him to suffer damages such as the 
loss of income that he would have had at Allegheny General, loss 
of personal and professional reputation, emotional distress, 
expenses for a new job search and the costs of appeals.  We 
cannot assume that if Brader had been given the benefit of the 
protections of the bylaws and been able, for example, to confront 
the witnesses against him, he would not have been able to 
successfully demonstrate the inadequacies of the case against 
him.  In fact, he did convince the Appellate Review Panel that 
there was no evidence to warrant the continued suspension of his 
clinical privileges. 
 The district court apparently assumed that, absent the 
alleged breaches, Brader still would have lost his position at 
Allegheny General.  Its discussion on this issue is cursory, but 
if the court based its conclusion on the results of Ochsner's 
allegedly independent review, the court failed to take into 
account that Brader has pled that Ochsner's review also failed to 
comply with the bylaws.  
 We therefore will reverse the district court's 
dismissal of Brader's breach of contract claims.  The allegations 
in the complaint allege a sufficient causal nexus between the 
alleged breaches and the damages suffered by Brader to support a 
cause of action under Pennsylvania law. 
E. 
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 Finally, defendants contend that this court should 
affirm the district court's order of dismissal due to Brader's 
failure to allege properly that defendants are not immune from 
suit under the Health Care Quality Improvement Act (HCQIA), 42 
U.S.C. §§ 11101-11151.  The HCQIA provides that parties to a 
professional review body shall not be liable for damages where 
the actions are taken "(1) in the reasonable belief that the 
action was in the furtherance of quality health care, (2) after a 
reasonable effort to obtain the facts of the matter, (3) after 
adequate notice and hearing procedures are afforded to the 
physician involved or after such procedures as are fair to the 
physician under the circumstances, and (4) in the reasonable 
belief that the action was warranted by the facts known after 
such reasonable effort to obtain facts and after meeting the 
requirements of paragraph (3)."  42 U.S.C. §§ 11111(a)(1), 
11112(a).   
 Under the HCQIA, professional review actions are 
presumed to meet the required standard unless that presumption is 
"rebutted by a preponderance of the evidence."  42 U.S.C. 
§11112(a).  This provision necessarily implies that plaintiffs 
bear the burden of proving noncompliance with these standards. 
See Bryan v. James E. Holmes Regional Medical Ctr., 33 F.3d 1318, 
1333 (11th Cir. 1994) (reviewing district court's denial of 
defendants' motion for judgment as a matter of law on the issue 
of HCQIA immunity), cert. denied, 115 S. Ct. 1363 (1995).  It 
also implies some opportunity to discover relevant evidence.  See 
Smith v. Ricks, 31 F.3d 1478, 1485 (9th Cir. 1994) (suggesting 
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that the "reasonableness" requirements of HCQIA may be addressed 
through a motion for summary judgment), cert. denied, 115 S. Ct. 
1400 (1995). 
          On appeal, defendants focus on the adequacy of Brader's 
pleadings regarding defendants' HCQIA immunity, arguing that the 
complaint's recitation of the language of HCQIA is insufficient 
to support an absence of HCQIA immunity.  However, Brader made 
extensive allegations regarding alleged improprieties by 
physicians participating in Allegheny General's peer review 
process.  If Brader's allegations, such as the alleged failure to 
provide Brader with fair hearing procedures, are true, the 
defendants would not be entitled to HCQIA immunity.  We therefore 
decline to affirm the district court's dismissal of Brader's 
claims on the alternative grounds of HCQIA immunity. 
 We understand that the HCQIA was enacted at least in 
part to protect hospitals and other care providers from the type 
of frivolous suit complaining about staffing decisions that 
concerned the court in BCB.  Moreover, we also are concerned that 
health care providers may be deterred by the expense of 
litigation from promptly terminating the privileges of physicians 
and other employees who the hospital believes are not competent 
to discharge the life and death decisions for which they have 
responsibility.  On the other hand, these considerations cannot 
justify the judiciary in pretermitting consideration of the 
application of the antitrust laws to the health care field, 
particularly now that the provision of health services is 
becoming increasingly concentrated and the opportunities for 
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physicians more limited.  Once the plaintiff has alleged that the 
defendants have failed to satisfy the requirements of HCQIA 
immunity, we can only rely on the Federal Rules of Civil 
Procedure, particularly the obligations of parties and attorneys 
under Rule 11, to stem the tide of lawsuits subsequently held to 
be without factual or legal foundation.  
III. 
Conclusion 
 For the foregoing reasons, we will reverse the district 
court's dismissal of Brader's claims and remand for proceedings 
consistent with this opinion. 
